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Abstract
We study multiplayer stochastic multi-armed bandit problems in which
the players cannot communicate, and if two or more players pull the same
arm, a collision occurs and the involved players receive zero reward. We con-
sider two feedback models: a model in which the players can observe whether
a collision has occurred, and a more difficult setup when no collision informa-
tion is available. We give the first theoretical guarantees for the second model:
an algorithm with a logarithmic regret, and an algorithm with a square-root
regret type that does not depend on the gaps between the means. For the first
model, we give the first square-root regret bounds that do not depend on the
gaps. Building on these ideas, we also give an algorithm for reaching approx-
imate Nash equilibria quickly in stochastic anti-coordination games.
1 Introduction
The stochastic multi-armed bandit problem is a well-studied problem of machine
learning: consider an agent that has to choose among several actions in each round
of a game. To each action i is associated a real-valued parameter µi . Whenever the
player performs the i-th action, she receives a random reward with mean µi . If
the player knew the means associated to the actions before starting the game, she
would play an action with the highest mean during all rounds. The problem is to
design a strategy for the player to maximize her reward in the setting where she
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does not know the means. The regret of the strategy is the difference between the
accumulated rewards in the two scenarios.
This problem encapsulates the well-known exploration/exploitation trade-
off: the player never learns the means exactly, but can estimate them. As the game
proceeds, she learns that some of the actions probably have better means, so she
can ‘exploit’ these actions to obtain a better reward, but at the same time she has
to ‘explore’ other actions as well, since they might have higher means. We refer
the reader to Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012) for a survey on this problem. Tra-
ditionally, actions are called ‘arms’ and ‘pulling an arm’ refers to performing an
action.
We study a multiplayer version of this game, in which each player pulls
an arm in each round, and if two or more players pull the same arm, a collision
occurs and all players pulling that arm receive zero reward. The players’ goal is to
maximize the collective received reward.
One application for this model is opportunistic spectrum access with mul-
tiple users in a cognitive radio network: we have a radio network with several
channels (corresponding to the arms) that have been purchased by primary users.
There are also secondary users (the players) that can try to use these channels dur-
ing the rounds when the primary users are not transmitting. Successfully using a
channel to transmit a message means a unit reward, and not transmitting means
zero reward. If more than one secondary users try to use the same channel in
the same round, a collision occurs and none of them can transmit. If a unique sec-
ondary user tries to use a channel, she will succeed if the primary user owning that
channel happens to be idle in that round, which happens with a certain probabil-
ity. Thus, the reward of the secondary user is a Bernoulli random variable whose
mean depends on the activity of the corresponding primary user, and whether
other secondary users have tried to use the same channel. See Liu and Zhao (2010,
Section I.D) for other applications.
Onemay consider (at least) two possible feedbackmodels: in the first model,
whenever a player pulls an arm, she observes whether a collision has occurred on
that arm, and receives a reward. In the second model the player just receives a re-
ward, without observing whether a collision has occurred (of course, if the reward
is positive, she can infer that no collision has occurred, but if the reward is zero, it
is not clear whether a collision has occurred or not). The first feedback model has
been studied in a series of work where theoretical guarantees have been proved.
The second feedbackmodel was introduced by Bonnefoi, Besson, Moy, Kaufmann, and Palicot
(2017), motivated by large scale IoT applications, and further studied by Besson and Kaufmann
(2018), but for this model no theoretical guarantees have been proved.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
1. We offer the first theoretical guarantees for the secondmodel, where the play-
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ers do not observe collision information. We propose an algorithm with a
logarithmic regret (in terms of the number of rounds), and we also give an
algorithm with a sublinear regret that does not depend on the gaps between
the means.
2. For the first model, in which the players observe collision information, we
prove the first sublinear regret bounds that do not depend on the gaps be-
tween the means.
3. One may also view this setup as a stochastic anti-coordination game. Using
the algorithmic ideas introduced here, we give an algorithm for reaching an
approximate Nash equilibrium quickly in such games.
1.1 The model, results, and organization
Let K > 1 be a positive integer and let µ1, . . . ,µK be nonnegative numbers corre-
sponding to the arm means. Let Yi,t be the reward of arm i in round t, so the {Yi,t}
are independent, identically distributed, and EYi,t = µi . We may assume, by rela-
belling the arms if necessary, that µ1 ≥ · · · ≥ µK . The players are of course unaware
of this labelling.
A set of m > 1 players play the following game for T > 0 rounds: in each
round t = 1, . . . ,T , player j chooses an arm Aj(t) ∈ {1, . . . ,K}≕ [K]. Let Ci(t) ∈ {0,1}
be the collision indicator for arm i in round t, that is, Ci(t) = 1 if and only if
there exist distinct j, j ′ with Aj(t) = Aj ′(t) = i. Player j receives the reward rj (t) =
YAj (t),t(1−CAj (t)(t)) in round t.
We will also consider a stronger feedback model, in which each player j also
observes CAj (t)(t) in each round t; this is called ‘the model with collision informa-
tion.’
The regret of a strategy is defined as
Regret = T
∑
i∈[m]
µi −
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[m]
µAj (t)(1−CAj(t)(t)) (1)
Note that regret is a random variable (since the strategy can randomize
hence Aj(t) can be random) and we will bound its expected value, although ‘with
high probability’ bounds can also be derived from our proofs.
To simplify the statements and proofs of our main theorems, we make three
additional assumptions, which can be relaxed at the expense of getting worse
bounds, as discussed in Section 4.
(Assumption 1) K ≥m: there are at least as many arms as players.
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(Assumption 2) YAj(t),t is supported on [0,1] so the means µi and the rewards rj(t)
are also in [0,1].
(Assumption 3) All players know the values of both T and m.
Note that we assume no communication between the players, and our al-
gorithms are totally distributed. All of our algorithms are explicit, simple, and
efficient.
We can now state our main theorems. Let ∆ ≔ µm − µm+1. All the follow-
ing results correspond to the weak feedback model (i.e., no collision information),
except if stated otherwise. Certainly any regret upper bound for this model auto-
matically carries over to the stronger feedback model as well.
Theorem 1.1. There is an algorithm with expected regret O(mK log(T )/∆2).
In this theorem and throughout, the notation f = O(g) means there exists
an absolute constant C such that for all admissible parameters, f ≤ Cg .
A shortcoming of Theorem 1.1 is that it gives a vacuous bound if ∆ = 0, and
gives a very bad bound if ∆ is very small. Moreover, one may wonder if a regret of
the form
√
T is possible that is independent of the gaps, as in the single player case.
The following theorem shows this is possible, under some weak assumptions. Let
∆
′
≔max{∆,min{|µm−µi | : µm−µi > 0}}. Observe that ∆′ ≥ ∆, and that ∆′ is positive
unless all arms have the same mean.
Theorem 1.2. (a) Suppose all players know a lower bound µ for µm. Then there is an
algorithm with expected regret O(K2m log2(T )/µ+Kmmin{√T logT , log(T )/∆′}).
(b) For the stronger feedback model, in which the players observe the collision
information, there is an algorithm with expected regret
O(K2m log2(T ) +Kmmin{
√
T logT , log(T )/∆′}) =O(K2m
√
T logT ).
(c) Suppose each player has the option of leaving the game at any point; that is,
she can choose not to pull from some round onwards. Then, for any µ > 0, there exists an
algorithmwith expected regretO(µmT+K2m log2(T )/µ+Kmmin{√T logT , log(T )/∆′}).
In particular, setting µ = K log(T )/
√
T gives an algorithm whose expected regret is
O(Km
√
T logT ).
We do not know whether our regret upper bounds are tight; proving lower
bounds is left for further work. Some asymptotic lower bounds for the stronger
feedback model have been proved by Besson and Kaufmann (2018, Section 3).
Another interesting avenue for future research is the setting in which the
rewards are not i.i.d., but are chosen by an adversary.
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The three algorithms proving Theorem 1.2 are quite similar. All of our algo-
rithms have the property that, eventually each player fixates on one arm. This can
be viewed as ‘reaching an equilibrium’ in a game-theoretic framework, where the
actions correspond to arms, and the outcome of each action is the mean of the arm
if no two players choose that action, and zero otherwise. Games with the property
that ‘if two or more players choose the same action then their outcome is zero’ are
called ‘anti-coordination games.’ Using our techniques for multiplayer bandits,
we also provide an algorithm for converging to an approximate Nash equilibrium
quickly in such a game.
More precisely, we define a stochastic anti-coordination game as follows: for
each player j ∈ [m] and action i ∈ [K], there is an outcome µij ∈ [0,1], such that if
player j performs action i while no other player performs it, she will get a random
reward in [0,1] with mean µij , while if two or more players perform the same action
i, all get reward 0. An assignment of players to actions is an ε-Nash equilibrium
if, no player can improve her expected reward by more than ε by switching to
another action, while other players’ actions are unchanged. Then, we would like
to design an algorithm for each player that reaches an ε-Nash equilibrium quickly.
We prove the following theorem in this direction.
Theorem 1.3. There is a distributed algorithm that with probability at least 1 − δ
converges to an ε-Nash equilibrium in any stochastic anti-coordination game within
O(log(K/δ)(K/ε2 +K2/ε)) many rounds.
In proving this theorem we assume each player also has the option of choos-
ing a ‘dummy’ action with zero reward, which is given index 0. This is a realistic
assumption in most applications.
Next we review some related work. Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 are proved in
Sections 2 and 3, respectively. In Section 4 we discuss how to relax Assumptions
1–3 above. Finally, the proof of Theorem 1.3 appears in Section 5.
1.2 Related work
There is little previous work on themodel without observing collision information:
themodel was introduced by Bonnefoi et al. (2017) and further studied by Besson and Kaufmann
(2018). These papers introduce an algorithm and study it empirically, but no the-
oretical guarantee is given. In particular, it is argued in Besson and Kaufmann
(2018, Appendix E) that the expected regret of that algorithm is linear.
We now review previous work on the stronger feedback model with col-
lision information available to the players. The multiplayer multi-armed ban-
dit games were introduced by Anantharam, Varaiya, and Walrand (1987) and fur-
ther studied by Komiyama, Honda, and Nakagawa (2015). They studied a cen-
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tralized algorithm, that is, when there is a single centre that controls the play-
ers, and observes the rewards of all players. The distributed setting was intro-
duced by Liu and Zhao (2010), where an algorithm was given with expected regret
bounded by κ logT , with κ depending on the game parameters, that is, m, K , and
the arm means. They also showed that any algorithm must have regret Ω(logT ).
The dependence of κ on the parameters was further improved byAnandkumar, Michael, Tang, and Swami
(2011); Rosenski, Shamir, and Szlak (2016); Besson and Kaufmann (2018).
In Rosenski et al. (2016) a ‘musical chairs’ subroutine was introduced to re-
duce the number of collisions; we have further developed and used this subroutine
in our algorithms. Their final algorithm requires the knowledge of ∆ and its regret
is bounded by O(m2 +mK2 ln(T ) +mK ln(KT )/∆2), which is at least as large as the
bound of Theorem 1.1.
Besson and Kaufmann (2018) tightened the previous lower bounds, and also
developed an algorithm whose regret is bounded by
O (log(T ))

K∑
i=m+1
m
kl(µi ,µm)
+
∑
1≤i<j≤K
m3
kl(µj ,µi )
 ,
where kl(x,y)≔ x log(x/y)+(1−x) log((1−x)/(1−y)). This bound is not comparable
with the bound of Theorem 1.1 in general; however if µ1 = · · · = µm = 1/2 and
µm+1 = · · · = µK = 1/2 −∆, then their bound becomes O(m3K2 log(T )/∆2), which is
worse than our bound by a multiplicative factor of m2K .
We emphasize that all the previously known upper bounds become vacuous
if ∆ = 0, whereas our Theorem 1.2 gives sublinear bounds in this case.
Finally, Avner and Mannor (2014); Rosenski, Shamir, and Szlak (2016) also
study a dynamic version of the problem, in which the players can leave the game
and new players can arrive, and prove sublinear regret bounds. We do not study
such scenarios here.
Preliminaries. We denote [n]≔ {1, . . . ,n}. All logarithms are in the natural base.
We will use the following versions of Chernoff-Hoeffding concentration inequali-
ties; see, e.g., McDiarmid (1998, Theorem 2.3):
Proposition 1.4. Let the random variables X1, . . . ,Xn be independent, with 0 ≤ Xk ≤ 1
for each k. Let µ̂ =
∑
Xk/n and µ = Eµ̂. Then we have,
(a) for any t ≥ 0,
P
{|µ̂− µ| > t} < 2exp(−2nt2),
(b) and, for any ε > 0,
P
{
µ̂ < (1− ε)µ} < exp(−ε2nµ/2).
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2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Each of the players follow the same algorithm, which has four phases, described
next. Note that the phases are not synchronized, that is, each phase may have
different starting and stopping times for each player. Let g = 128K log(3Km2T 2).
Phase 1: The player pulls arms uniformly at random, and maintains an estimate
for the mean of each arm: the estimate for arm i is the average reward
received from arm i, divided by (1 − 1/K)m−1. Note that (1 − 1/K)m−1 is
precisely the probability of not getting a conflict for each pull provided
that the other players are also pulling arms uniformly at random, hence
this is indeed an unbiased estimate for µi . In other words, for any round
t that arm i is pulled and reward r(t) is received, since conflicts and re-
wards are independent we have
µi = EYi,t = Er(t)/E(1−Ci(t)) = Er(t)/(1− 1/K)m−1.
For each round t, the player maintains a sorted list µ̂i1,t ≥ · · · ≥ µ̂iK ,t of
estimated means, and let τ be the first round when µ̂im ,τ−µ̂im+1,τ ≥ 3
√
g/τ.
The first phase finishes at the end of round τ. By this time, the player has
learned the best m arms with high probability (as we prove later), and so
has a list G ⊆ [K] of m arms with the highest means.
Phase 2: For 24τ rounds, the player just pulls arms uniformly at random, without
updating the estimates.
Phase 3: The player plays a so-called Musical Chairs algorithm until it occupies an
arm: in each round, she pulls a uniformly random arm i ∈ G. If she gets
a positive reward (which means no other player has pulled arm i), we say
the player has ‘occupied’ arm i, and this phase is finished for the player.
Note that, by construction, at most one player will occupy any given arm.
Phase 4: The player pulls the occupied arm forever.
The pseudocode is shown as Algorithm 1. We next analyze the regret of this
algorithm, starting with some preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose T ≥ 17. Consider any fixed player and let µ̂i,t denote her esti-
mated mean for arm i after t rounds of Phase 1. Then we have
P
{
∃i ∈ [K], t ∈ [τ] : |µ̂i,t − µi | >
√
g/t
}
< 3KT exp(−g/128K).
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Algorithm 1: the algorithm for Theorem 1.1
Input: number of players m, number of arms K , number of rounds T
1 g ←− 128K log(3Km2T 2)
2 µ̂i ←− 0 for all i ∈ [K]
// Phase 1 starts
3 τ ←− 0
4 repeat
5 pull a uniformly random arm i
6 µ̂i ←− average reward from arm i, divided by (1− 1/K)m−1
7 Sort the µ̂ vector as µ̂i1 ≥ · · · ≥ µ̂iK
8 τ ←− τ +1
9 until µ̂im − µ̂im+1 ≥ 3
√
g/τ
10 Best-m-arms←− {i1, i2, . . . , im}
// Phase 2 starts
11 for 24τ rounds do pull arms uniformly at random
// Phase 3 starts
12 i ←−MusicalChairs1 (Best-m-arms)
// Phase 4 starts
13 Pull arm i until end of game
Subroutine MusicalChairs1(A)
Input: set A ⊆ [K] of target arms
Output: index of an occupied arm
1 while true do
2 pull an arm i ∈ A uniformly at random
3 if positive reward is received then output i // arm i is occupied
4 end
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Proof. Fix an arm i ∈ [K]. Observe that µ̂i,t ≤ 1/(1− 1/K)m−1 < 1/(1− 1/K)K ≤ 4, so
we have |µ̂i,t − µi | ≤ 4 deterministically, so for t ≤ g/16 we have |µ̂i,t − µi | ≤
√
g/t.
Now fix a t > g/16. Let Ti(t) denote the number of times this player has pulled arm
i by round t, which is a binomial random variable with mean t/K , hence Proposi-
tion 1.4(b) implies P {Ti(t) < t/(2K)} < exp(−t/8K). Thus, the union bound gives
P
{
|µ̂i,t − µi | >
√
g/t
}
< exp(−t/8K) + max
t
2K≤s≤t
P
{
|µ̂i,t − µi | >
√
g/t
∣∣∣∣Ti(t) = s} .
Also, conditioned on any s ∈ [t], |µ̂i,t − µi | is the difference between an empirical
average of s i.i.d. random variables bounded in [0,4] and their expected value,
thus Proposition 1.4(a) gives
P
{
|µ̂i,t − µi | >
√
g/t
∣∣∣∣Ti(t) = s} < 2exp(−sg/8t),
giving
P
{
|µ̂i,t − µi | >
√
g/t
}
< exp(−t/8K) + 2exp(−g/16K).
We now apply a union bound over t ∈ {⌈g/16⌉, . . . ,T } to get
P
{
∃t ∈ [τ] : |µ̂i,t − µi | >
√
g/t
}
<

T∑
t=⌈g/16⌉
exp(−t/8K)
+2T exp(−g/16K)
< 17exp(−g/128K) + 2T exp(−g/16K)
< 3T exp(−g/128K),
since K ≥ 2 and T ≥ 17. Applying a union bound over the K arms concludes the
proof of the lemma.
Corollary 2.2. With probability at least 1− 1/mT , the following are true:
(i) all players have learned the best m arms by end of their Phase 1,
(ii) we have
g/∆2 ≤ τ ≤ 25g/∆2
for all players, and
(iii) the first two phases are finished for all players after at most 625g/∆2 many rounds.
Proof. By the choice of g = 128K log(3Km2T 2), Lemma 2.1 and a union bound over
them players, we have that with probability at least 1−1/mT , all players have mean
estimates that are
√
g/t-close to the actual means, uniformly for all arms and all
t ∈ [τ]. If this event holds then the three parts follow.
Part (i) follows by noting that a player would stop Phase 1 when she has
found a gap of size 3
√
g/t between themth the and the (m+1)th arm. However, by
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this time she has learned the means of all arms within an error of
√
g/t, therefore
by the triangle inequality, she has correctly determined that themth mean is larger
than the (m+1)th mean, whence has learned the best m arms.
For part (ii), using the triangle inequality and the definition of τ we have√
3g
τ
≤ µ̂m,τ − µ̂m+1,τ ≤ (µ̂m,τ − µm) + (µm − µm+1) + (µm+1 − µ̂m+1,τ) ≤
√
g
τ
+∆+
√
g
τ
,
whence τ ≥ g/∆2. On the other hand, for t = 25g/∆2,
µ̂m,t − µ̂m+1,t ≥ (µm − µm+1)− |µ̂m,t − µm| − |µm+1 − µ̂m+1,t | ≥ ∆ − 2
√
g/t ≥ 3g/
√
t,
whence τ ≤ t.
Part (iii) follows from part (ii) and noting that the duration of Phase 2 is
24τ.
The curious reader may wonder about the role of Phase 2 and ask why can-
not a player proceed to Phase 3 right after she has learned the best m arms? The
reason is to help other players to find the best m arms. Indeed, it is possible that
a player finishes Phase 1 by round g/∆2, but the algorithm asks her to continue
pulling arms at random, so that the other players continue to have unbiased esti-
mators for the means, for at least 24g/∆2 many more rounds, at which point we
are guaranteed that all players have finished their Phase 1. Otherwise, if a player
switches to Phase 3 too quickly, then this would skew the collision probabilities,
and the other players will not have unbiased estimators of the means.
We now proceed to analyze Phase 3, the musical chairs subroutine. By this
point all players have learned the best m arms, hence they just want to share these
m arms between themselves as quickly as possible. Note that by definition of the
subroutine, once this phase is finished, each player has occupied a distinct arm.
Lemma 2.3. With probability at least 1−1/mT , Phase 3 takes at most 4m log(m2T )/∆
many rounds for all players.
Proof. We use the fact that, each reward Yi,t is bounded in [0,1], hence P
{
Yi,t > 0
} ≥
EYi,t . Fix any player in her Phase 3 who has not occupied an arm, and suppose
there are still a unoccupied arms available for her. (There are m players, and each
occupies at most 1 arm, hence a ≥ 1.) Whenever she tries to occupy an unoccupied
arm, her success probability is at least
a
m
∆(1− 1/m)m−a ≥ ∆/4m.
Here, am ≥ 1/m is the probability that she pulls an unoccupied arm, ∆ ≤ µm is a
lower bound for the probability that that arm produces a positive reward, and
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(1− 1/m)m−a ≥ 1/4 is the probability that, none of the other players pull that arm.
Hence, the probability that the player has not occupied an arm after t attempts
can be bounded by (1 −∆/4m)t ≤ exp(−t∆/4m). Letting t = 4m log(m2T )/∆ makes
this probability ≤ 1/Tm2. Applying the union bound over all players completes
the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. By Corollary 2.2 and Lemma 2.3, with probability at least
1 − 2/mT , the first three phases finish for all players after at most 625g/∆2 +
4m log(m2T )/∆ = O(K log(KT )/∆2) many rounds, and after this time, each player
has occupied one of the best m arms, and different players have occupied distinct
arms. During each round, the regret is at most m, hence the total regret incurred
during the first three phases is bounded byO(mK log(KT )/∆2), and the regret after-
wards would be 0. On the other hand, with the remaining 2/mT probability, the re-
gret is at mostmT . Therefore, the expected regret is at mostO(mK log(KT )/∆2)+2,
as required. The O(log(KT )) can be replaced with O(log(T )), noting that
min{mT ,O(mK log(KT )/∆2)} =O(mK log(T )/∆2).
(Similar replacements of O(log(KT )) with O(log(T )) will also be done in a few
other places in the following.)
3 Proof of Theorem 1.2
3.1 The modified musical chairs subroutines
We need a modified version of the musical chairs algorithm, which we call Musi-
calChairs2. For any ‘target’ set A of arms and any number α of rounds, this sub-
routine consists of precisely α rounds as follows: in each round the player pulls a
uniformly random arm j ∈ [K]. If she gets a positive reward, and j ∈ A, then she
occupies arm j, pulls arm j for the remaining rounds, and outputs j. Otherwise
she tries again. If after α rounds she has not occupied any arm, she outputs 0. See
the pseudocode below. The following lemma bounds the failure probability of this
subroutine.
Lemma3.1. Let µ ∈ [0,1] be arbitrary. Suppose a player executesMusicalChairs2(A,α),
while any other player either has occupied an arm, or is executing MusicalChairs2, or
is pulling arms uniformly at random during these α rounds. We say the player is ‘suc-
cessful’ if after the execution of the subroutine she has occupied an arm, or each arm
in A with mean ≥ µ is occupied by other players. The probability of ‘failure’ is upper
bounded by exp(−αµ/4K) if m ≤ K , and by exp(−αµexp(−2m/K)/K) in general.
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Subroutine MusicalChairs2(A, α)
Input: set A ⊆ [K] of target arms, number α ∈ {0,1, . . . } of rounds
Output: index of an occupied arm, or 0 if no arm was occupied
1 for i ←− 1 to α do
2 pull an arm j ∈ [K] uniformly at random
3 if j ∈ A and positive reward is received then // arm j is occupied
4 pull arm j for the remaining α − i rounds
5 output j
6 end
7 end
// no arm is occupied
8 output 0
Proof. At any round during the subroutine, suppose the player has not occupied
an arm and that there are still a ≥ 1 unoccupied arms of mean ≥ µ in A. Whenever
she tries to occupy one of her target arms, her success probability is at least
a
K
µ(1− 1/K)m−1 ≥ µexp(−2m/K)/K.
Here, aK ≥ 1/K is the probability that she pulls an unoccupied arm in her target
set with mean ≥ µ, µ is a lower bound for the probability that that arm produces
a positive reward, and (1 − 1/K)m−1 ≥ exp(−2m/K) is the probability that none
of the other players pull the same arm. (Note that her success probability may
indeed be larger than this, because she may also occupy arms in her target set
with mean < µ.) Hence, the probability that she has not occupied an arm after
α attempts can be bounded by (1 − µexp(−2m/K)/K)α ≤ exp(−αµexp(−2m/K)/K).
The argument when m ≤ K is identical, except we would use the tighter bound
(1− 1/K)m−1 > (1− 1/K)K ≥ 1/4.
The following corollary provides a guarantee when many players execute
MusicalChairs2 in parallel. The proof is via applying a union bound over the
participating players.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose a subset of players execute MusicalChairs2 for the same num-
ber α of rounds, but with potentially different target sets, while the other players are
either pulling random arms or have occupied arms during these α rounds. We say the
subroutine is successful if all players are successful. The probability that the subroutine
fails can be bounded by mexp(−αµ/4K) if m ≤ K , and mexp(−αµexp(−2m/K)/K) in
general.
In the stronger feedback model in which the players observe the collision
information, we modify the MusicalChairs2 algorithm such that for a player to
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occupy an arm, instead of receiving a positive reward, she would look at the col-
lision information, and would occupy the arm if there was no collision. Call this
subroutine MusicalChairs3. We get the following corollary for the failure prob-
ability, whose statement and proof are identical to that for Corollary 3.2, except
there is no parameter µ.
Subroutine MusicalChairs3(A, α)
Input: set A ⊆ [K] of target arms, number α ∈ {0,1, . . . } of rounds
Output: index of an occupied arm, or 0 if no arm was occupied
1 for i ←− 1 to α do
2 pull an arm j ∈ [K] uniformly at random
3 if j ∈ A and there was no collision then // arm j is occupied
4 pull arm j for the remaining α − i rounds
5 output j
6 end
7 end
// no arm is occupied
8 output 0
Corollary 3.3. Consider the stronger feedback model with collision information avail-
able. Suppose a subset of players execute MusicalChairs3 for the same number α of
rounds, but with potentially different target sets, while the other players are either
pulling random arms or have occupied arms during these α rounds. We say the sub-
routine is successful if all players are successful. The probability that the subroutine
fails is at most mexp(−αµ/4K) if m ≤ K , and mexp(−αµexp(−2m/K)/K) in general.
3.2 The whole algorithm
We focus on proving part (a), and then explain how the algorithm should be modi-
fied to prove parts (b) and (c). Recall that µ is a lower bound for µm that all players
know in advance.
We describe the algorithm each player executes, first informally and then
formally. The player maintains estimates µ̂ for the means, which get closer to
actual means as the algorithm proceeds. She also keeps a ‘confidence interval’ for
each arm j, which is centred at µ̂j and has the property that µj lies in this interval
with sufficiently high probability. If arm j has been pulled s times, this interval
has length O(
√
log(T )/s). Once the player makes sure that some arm is not among
the best m arms, she marks it as bad and puts it in a set B. This can happen either
if it is determined that the arm has mean < µ, or if it is determined that there
are at least m arms whose confidence intervals lie strictly above this arm’s interval
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(we say interval [c,d] lies strictly above [a,b] if b < c). On the other hand, once
the player makes sure that some arm is within the best m arms, she marks it as
a ‘golden’ arm, and puts it in a set G. More precisely, this would happen as soon
as there are at least K −m arms that are either determined to be bad, or whose
confidence intervals lie strictly below this arm. Other arms (whose status is yet
unknown) are called ‘silver’ arms and kept in a set S.
Initially all arms are silver. The algorithm proceeds in epochs with increas-
ing lengths. In each epoch, the player explores all the silver arms and hopes to
characterize each silver arm as golden or bad at the end of the epoch. As time
proceeds, arms whose means are far away from the mth arm will be characterized
as either golden or bad. Golden arms will be occupied quickly, and bad arms will
not be pulled again, and this will control the algorithm’s regret.
Special care is needed to ensure all players explore all the silver arms with-
out conflicts, and this is done via careful sequences of MusicalChairs2 subroutines.
In each epoch, each player maintains a set E of explored arms, which is empty
when the epoch starts. The epoch has K +m − 1 iterations. In each iteration, if
there exists some arm in S \ E (i.e., an unexplored silver arm), the player tries to
occupy such an arm; otherwise, the player has finished exploring the arms in S,
and she will try to occupy and pull an arbitrary arm from S, while other players
are exploring their silver arms. Say an arm is µ-good if its mean is at least µ, and
is µ-bad otherwise. Note that by assumption, any µ-bad arm is bad. The length of
the MusicalChairs2 subroutines are chosen such that any µ-good arm in S, which
is not marked as golden by any other player, will be explored in each epoch by
each player. Thus, if an arm is not explored by the end of epoch (that is, if it lies
in S \E), that would mean the either the arm is µ-bad or the arm is golden and is
occupied by another player in the beginning of the epoch. The two cases can be
distinguished by checking the empirical reward received from that arm.
The complete pseudocode appears as Algorithm 2 below. Note that this
algorithm is synchronized: for all players the epochs and the iterations within the
epochs begin and end at the same round.
To analyze the regret of the algorithm, we first define two bad events. The
first bad event is that some of the MusicalChairs2 subroutines fail, and the second
bad event is that some player’s confidence interval is incorrect, that is, the actual
mean does not lie in the confidence interval. We start by bounding the probability
of the bad events. Let α = 4K log(6Km2T )/µ and g = log(4m3T 2K)/2.
Lemma 3.4. The probability that some bad event happens is at most 1/mT .
Proof. The probability that some MusicalChairs2 subroutine fails is bounded by
mexp(−αM/4K) by Corollary 3.2. Applying the union bound over the (at most T )
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Algorithm 2: the algorithm for Theorem 1.2(a)
Input: number of players m, number of arms K , number of rounds T , lower
bound µ for µn
1 g ←− log(4m3T 2K)/2, α ←− 4K log(6Km2T )/µ
2 µ̂i ←− 0 for all i ∈ [K]
3 G←− ∅,B←− ∅,S ←− [K]
4 for epoch i = 1,2, . . . , do
5 j ←−MusicalChairs2(G,α) // occupy a golden arm if possible
6 if j > 0 then disregard the rest of the algorithm and pull arm j forever
7 E ←− ∅ // the set of arms that have been explored in this epoch
8 for K +m− 1 iterations do // goal: explore all silver arms by end
of this loop
9 j ←− 0
10 if E , S then
11 j ←−MusicalChairs2 (S \E,α) // occupy an unexplored arm
12 else
13 randomly pull arms in the next α rounds // all silver arms have
been explored in this epoch, so waste time for α rounds
14 end
15 if j = 0 then
16 j ←−MusicalChairs2 (S,α) // occupy any silver arm
17 else
18 pull arm j for α rounds // keep on occupying arm j
19 end
20 pull arm j for 2i rounds and let µ̂j ←− the average reward received
21 update confidence interval of arm j to
[
µ̂j −
√
g/2i , µ̂j +
√
g/2i
]
22 insert j into E // add j to the set of explored arms
23 end
24 foreach j ∈ S \E do // put the unexplored arms in either G or B
25 if µ̂j −
√
g/2i−1 > µ then
26 move j from S to G // arm j is occupied by another player
27 else
28 move j from S to B // arm j has mean < µ
29 end
30 end
31 foreach j ∈ S do // update the golden and bad arms
32 if there exist at least m− |G| arms ℓ ∈ S with µ̂ℓ −
√
g/2i > µ̂j +
√
g/2i then
33 move j from S to B
34 else if µ̂j > µ+3
√
g/2i and there exist at least K −m− |B| arms ℓ ∈ S with
µ̂ℓ +
√
g/2i < µ̂j −
√
g/2i then
35 move j from S to G
36 end
37 end
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epochs and the 1 + 2(K +m − 1) ≤ 3Km times MusicalChairs2 is executed in each
epoch, gives the probability that some MusicalChairs2 subroutine fails is at most
3Km×T ×mexp(−αM/4K) ≤ 1/2mT ,
by the choice of α = 4K log(6Km2T )/µ.
Whenever a confidence interval for some arm j is updated in some epoch i
(Line 21), the arm has been pulled precisely 2i times right before that (Line 20).
The probability that some confidence interval is incorrect for some player, say in
epoch i, is hence bounded via Proposition 1.4(a) by
P
{
|µ̂j − µj | >
√
g/2i
}
< 2exp(−2× 2ig/2i) = 2exp(−2g).
Now applying the union bound over them players, the (at most T ) epochs, and the
K +m−1 ≤ Km number of updating of the confidence intervals within each epoch,
gives the probability of some incorrect confidence interval is at most
m×T ×Km× 2exp(−2g) ≤ 1/2mT ,
by the choice of g = log(4m3T 2K)/2, as required.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.2(a).
Proof of Theorem 1.2(a). We bound the regret assuming no bad events happen, and
the bound for the expected regret follows as in the proof of Theorem 1.1.
Note that each epoch has two types of rounds: estimation rounds (Line 20) in
which each arm is pulled by at most one player, during which she updates her esti-
mate of its mean, and other rounds during which some of the players are executing
MusicalChairs2, hence we call themMusicalChairs2 rounds.
Observe that, since there are at leastm µ-good arms, we always have |G∪S | ≥
m and since the MusicalChairs2 subroutines are always successful, there can be no
conflict during the estimation rounds.
The first claim is the following: consider a player that has just executed her
Line 7 in epoch i, and has not occupied a golden arm by end of epoch i. Consider
also a µ-good arm j that is silver, suppose this arm is not occupied by another
player as a golden arm in their Line 5. Then the claim is that the player will
pull arm j at least 2i times during epoch i Line 20, and it will be put in E at
the end of the K +m − 1 iterations. To see this, note that the epoch has K +m − 1
iterations. In each iteration, if the player has any unexplored silver arm, in the first
α rounds attempts to occupy one of those (Line 11), while the other players pull
random arms. By Lemma 3.5 below and since the MusicalChairs2 subroutines are
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successful, after the K +m− 1 iterations, each player has explored any such arm j.
Therefore, the confidence interval of each such arm will have length 2
√
g/2i .
The second claim is that if no bad event occurs, then the algorithm never
makes a mistake in characterizing the arms as golden/bad. First, the characteri-
zations based on confidence intervals (Lines 31–35) are correct because all confi-
dence intervals are correct. Next note that if j ∈ S \ E on Line 24, then j is not
explored, and that can be because of one of two reasons: first, its mean may be
smaller than µ, hence it is not occupied during the MusicalChairs2 subroutines.
Or, it may be a golden arm occupied by another player on her Line 5. In the latter
case, let µ̂′j be the average reward received from this arm by that other player. Sup-
pose the arm was marked as golden by the other player in epoch i ′ ≤ i − 1. Then
we must have µ̂′j > µ+3
√
g/2i
′
(see Line 34). This implies
µj ≥ µ̂′j −
√
g/2i
′
> µ+2
√
g/2i
′ ≥ µ+2
√
g/2i−1.
On the other hand, since j was silver at the end of epoch i − 1, we have µ̂j ≥
µj −
√
g/2i−1 > µ +
√
g/2i−1, hence Line 26 is executed and the player marks j as
golden. If this latter case has not happened, we are in the first case, so because the
confidence intervals are correct, µ lies in the confidence interval for arm j, which
has length
√
g/2i−1. This means µ̂j −
√
g/2i−1 ≤ µ, so Line 28 is executed and the
player correctly marks j as bad.
The third claim is that, any arm with mean < µm − 4
√
g/2i has been marked
as bad by all players by the end of epoch i. Let j be such an arm and suppose we
are at the end of epoch i. By definition of confidence intervals, it suffices to show
there exists at least m arms ℓ such that either ℓ ∈ G or µ̂ℓ − µ̂j > 2
√
g/2i . In fact
this holds for all ℓ ∈ [m], since for any such m, either ℓ ∈ G, or ℓ ∈ S, which implies
µ̂ℓ − µ̂j ≥ µℓ − µj − |µℓ − µ̂ℓ | − |µ̂j − µj | > 4
√
g/2i −
√
g/2i −
√
g/2i = 2
√
g/2i .
The fourth claim, whose proof is similar to the third claim, is that any arm
with mean > µm + 4
√
g/2i has been marked as golden by all players by the end of
epoch i. The only difference is the extra condition µ̂j > µ+3
√
g/2i , which is satisfied
by any such arm, since µ̂j ≥ µj −
√
g/2i by correctness of confidence intervals.
Now we bound the algorithm’s regret. First observe that the number of
epochs is fewer than log2(T ) < 2log(T ). The number of iterations per epoch is
K+m−1 < 2K , whence the total number of MusicalChairs2 rounds can be bounded
by 2log(T )(α+4Kα) ≤ 10Kα log(T ). Let us now bound the regret of the estimation
rounds. The regret of the first epoch can be bounded by m(K +m−1) ≤ 2Km. Next
note that any arm with mean > µm+4
√
g/2i−1 has been put inG by the end of epoch
i − 1 by all players (by fourth claim above), and so some player occupies it in the
beginning of epoch i. During epoch i, each of the remaining players pull either a
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silver or a golden arm, which are at most 8
√
g/2i−1 away from the best available
arms (by the third claim above). Since the probability that some bad event happens
is 1/mT (Lemma 3.4), and in this case the total regret can be bounded by mT , the
total expected regret can be bounded by
mT × (1/mT ) + 10mKα log(T ) + 2Km+m×
⌈log2(T )⌉∑
i=2
(2K × 2i × 18
√
g/2i−1)
=O(K2m log2(KT )/µ+Km
√
T log(KT )).
Recall that ∆′ = max{∆,min{|µm − µi | : µm − µi > 0}}. Let j be the smallest
integer that 4
√
g/2j < ∆′. So after the first j epochs, any remaining silver arm
would have mean precisely µm, and the regret will be zero after epoch j. The
algorithm’s regret can be alternatively bounded by
mT × (1/mT ) + 10Kmα log(T ) + 2Km+
j∑
i=2
8
√
g/2i−1(2Km)2i
=O(K2m log2(KT )/µ+Km log(KT )/∆′).
The following lemma is the last piece in completing the proof of Theo-
rem 1.2(a).
Lemma 3.5. Fix an epoch and suppose all MusicalChairs2 subroutines of Line 11 are
successful. Then, during the K +m − 1 iterations of the epoch, each player will occupy
each µ-good silver arm at least once.
Proof. Build a bipartite graph with one part being the players and the other part
the arms, with an edge between a player and an arm if the arm is silver for that
player. Say an edge is good if the corresponding arm is µ-good. Say two edges
are neighbours if they share a vertex, and the degree of an edge is its number of
neighbours. Initially, the degree of each edge is at most K +m − 2. Observe that,
whenever the MusicalChairs2 subroutine in Line 11 is executed, the set of edges
corresponding to players and their occupied arms forms a matching in this graph,
that is, a set of edges such that no two of them are neighbours. Moreover, since
the MusicalChairs2 subroutine is successful by assumption, this matching M has
the property that, for any good edge e, either e ∈ M or some neighbour of e lies
in M . After the execution of this subroutine, we delete this matching from the
graph, and hence the degree of each good edge decreases by 1. In particular, the
maximum degree of good edges decrease by 1, and once this maximum degree is
0, in the next iteration all good edges will be deleted. Therefore, after at most
K +m− 1 iterations, all good edges will be deleted, as required.
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The proof of Theorem 1.2(b) is identical, except we would choose α ≔
4K log(6Km2T ) in the algorithm, replace MusicalChairs2 with MusicalChairs3,
and use Corollary 3.3 instead of Corollary 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 1.2(c). The algorithm would be similar, except that if a player
has not occupied an arm when she wants to start an estimation period, she would
simply leave the game and never pull any arm again. To be more precise, add the
following line before line 20: ‘if j = 0 then leave the game.’ This could happen
if there are fewer than m many µ-good arms, and so players may fail to find and
occupy an arm. Suppose m′ of the best m arms are µ-bad. Once m′ players have
left the game, we will have m −m′ players and m −m′ many µ-good arms, so the
algorithm will work as in part (a), and the same analysis works. We would only
lose a reward of at most m′µT , due to players who have left the game.
4 Relaxing the assumptions
4.1 Unknown time horizon
If T is not known, we can apply a simple doubling trick: we execute the algorithm
assuming T = 1, then we execute it assuming T = 2× 1, and so on, until the actual
time horizon is reached. If the expected regret of the algorithm for a known time
horizon T is R(T ), then the expected regret of the modified algorithm for unknown
time horizon would be R′(T ) ≤∑⌊log2(T )⌋i=0 R(2i) ≤ log2(T )×R(T ). For example, if the
players have the option of leaving the game, we can apply Theorem 1.2(c) with
µ = K log(T )/
√
T to get the regret upper bound
R′(T ) ≤
⌊log2(T )⌋∑
i=0
O(Km log(2i)
√
2i ) ≤O(Km log(T ))×
⌊log2(T )⌋∑
i=0
O(2i/2) ≤O(Km
√
T log(T )),
which is within a constant multiplicative factor of the upper bound for R(T ).
4.2 Other reward distributions
In Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 we assumed the rewards are supported on [0,1]. We used
this assumption in three ways: first, we used that the expected regret incurred
any round can be bounded by m, second, that the rewards satisfy the Chernoff-
Hoeffding concentration inequality (Proposition 1.4(a)), and third, for correctness
proofs of the MusicalChairs1,2 subroutines we used the fact that P {X > 0} ≥ EX
for any random variable X ∈ [0,1].
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A random variableX is σ-sub-Gaussian if max{P {X −EX < −t} ,P {X −EX > t}}
< exp(−t2/2σ2), for example a standard normal random variable is 1-sub-Gaussian.
The first two facts hold for σ-sub-Gaussian random variables whose means lie in a
bounded interval [0, c] (with appropriate adjustments). For the proofs, see Vershynin
(2018, Section 2.5). The third fact also holds up to a logarithmic factor, see Lemma 4.1
below. Hence, our main theorems can be readily extended to such distributions,
with appropriate adjustments.
Lemma 4.1. Let X ≥ 0 be a random variable with mean µ that satisfies P {X > µ+ t} <
exp(−t2/2σ2). Then we have P {X > 0} ≥min{|µ/(σ log(σ/µ))|,1}/99.
Proof. By dividing X by σ we may assume σ = 1. Let t ≥ 0 be a parameter to be
chosen later, and define Y = X · 1[X > t + µ] and Z = X · 1[X ≤ t + µ]. Note that
µ = EX = EY +EZ and EZ ≤ P {X > 0} (t +µ). We next write EY as
EY =
∫ t+µ
0
P {Y > s}ds +
∫ ∞
t+µ
P {Y > s}ds
For 0 ≤ s ≤ t + µ, we have Y > s if and only if Y > 0 if and only if X > t +µ, whence∫ t+µ
0
P {Y > s}ds = (t + µ)P {X > t +µ} < (t + µ)exp(−t2/2). For the second term we
have ∫ ∞
t+µ
P {Y > s}ds <
∫ ∞
t
exp(−s2/2)ds < exp(−t2/2)/2t.
Consequently,
µ = EY +EZ < (t +µ+1/2t)exp(−t2/2) +P {X > 0} (t +µ),
which implies
P {X > 0} > µ− (t +µ+1/2t)exp(−t
2/2)
t +µ
.
Now, if µ ≤ 0.05 then setting t = log(1/µ) gives that the right-hand side is greater
than µ/(5log(1/µ)) = |µ/(5log(1/µ))|. (Here, we have used the inequality 5µ log(µ)+
5log(µ)exp(− log2µ/2)(log(µ)−µ+1/(2log(µ)))−µ log(µ)+µ2 < 0 which holds for all
0 < µ ≤ 0.05.)
On the other hand, if µ > 0.05, setting t = 4 gives that the right/hand side
is greater than 1/99, as required. (Here, we have used the inequality (98 − e−8)µ >
4+33× e−8/8, which holds for any µ > 0.05.)
4.3 More players than arms
If m > K , the term
∑
i∈[m]µi in the definition of regret (1) is not well defined, hence
we must redefine the regret. There are two natural ways to do this.
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4.3.1 Original model
In the original model, the best strategy of the players had they known the means
would be for K −1 of them to occupy the best K −1 arms, and for the rest to occupy
the worst arm; so the regret in this case can be defined as
Regret = T
∑
i∈[K−1]
µi −
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[m]
µAj (t)(1−CAj (t)(t)).
Let ∆≔ µK−1 − µK . We give an algorithm with regret O(mK log(T )exp(4m/K)/∆2).
The algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1. Let p≔ (1−1/K)m−1 ≥ exp(−2m/K)
be the probability of no-conflict, when the players pull arms uniformly at ran-
dom, and let g = CK log(KT )/p2, for a sufficiently large constant C. Each player
pulls arms randomly until at some round τ she finds a gap of 3
√
g/τ between the
(K − 1)th and Kth arm, and continues for 24τ more rounds to make sure that all
others have also found this gap. An argument similar to that of Corollary 2.2
gives that these two phases will take O(K log(KT )/p2∆2) many rounds. Moreover,
each player has learned that µK−1 ≥ ∆ ≥
√
g/τ and that
√
τ/g ≤ 5/∆ (see Corol-
lary 2.2(ii)). Then the player executes MusicalChairs2 on the set of K − 1 best
arms, for α = CK log(KT )
√
τ/g/p many rounds, for a large enough constant C.
Since mexp(−αµK−1p/K) ≤ mexp(−α
√
g/τp/K) < 1/mT , Lemma 3.1 implies that
with probability at least 1 − 1/mT all players will be successful, meaning that
the best K − 1 arms are occupied. After MusicalChair2 is finished, if the player
has occupied an arm she will pull it until the end of game, otherwise she pulls
the worst arm for the rest of game. Thus the regret will be zero after at most
O(K log(KT )/p2∆2)+O(K log(KT )
√
τ/g/p) ≤O(K log(KT )/p2∆2) many rounds, giv-
ing a total regret of O(mK log(KT )/p2∆2) ≤O(mK log(KT )exp(4m/K)/∆2).
4.3.2 Model allowing players to leave
Alternatively, if we allow the players to leave the game, the best strategy had we
known the means would be for m−K players to leave the game, and for the rest of
the players to occupy distinct arms. The regret in this model can be defined as
Regret = T
∑
i∈[K]
µi −
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[m]
µAj (t)(1−CAj (t)(t)) .
Wepropose a simple algorithm in this case: each player executes theMusicalChairs2
algorithm for a certain number of rounds, and if she has not occupied an arm by
that time, she leaves the game.
If the players know a lower bound µ for all the arm means, they play Mu-
sicalChairs2 for O(log(TK)K exp(2m/K)/µ) many rounds, and by Lemma 3.1, with
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probability at least 1 − 1/mT all the K arms are occupied, whence the expected
regret is bounded by O(mK log(T )exp(2m/K)/µ).
Otherwise, if the players observe the collision information, they play Mu-
sicalChairs3 for O(log(TK)K exp(2m/K)) many rounds, and the expected regret is
upper bounded by O(mK log(T )exp(2m/K)).
Finally, if the players have none of the above information, they play Mu-
sicalChairs2 for O(log(TK)K exp(2m/K)/µ) many rounds. With high probability
arms with means ≥ µ are occupied, and any other arm contributes a regret of at
most µT . So the total expected regret can be bounded byO(m log(T )K exp(2m/K)/µ)
+KµT , which after optimizing µ gives the bound O(K exp(m/K)
√
mT log(TK)) for
the regret.
4.4 Unknown number of players
In this section we assume m ≤ K . We do not know how to handle the case m > K ,
although if m ≤ CK for some absolute constant C, then the analysis in this section
works after appropriate adjustments, and all the derived asymptotic bounds hold.
If the players observe the collision information, then it is shown by Rosenski et al.
(2016, Lemma 2) that there is a simple algorithm withO(K2 log(1/δ)) many rounds
using which each player learnsmwith probability ≥ 1−δ. Setting δ = 1/K2T makes
sure this simultaneously holds for all players with probability ≥ 1− 1/KT , and af-
ter this estimation is done, the players can run the algorithm of Theorem 1.2(b).
The additional regret due to these estimation rounds is O(K2m log(KT )), which is
dominated by the final regret upper bound of Theorem 1.2(b).
For the model without the collision information, we shall assume the play-
ers know that at least one arm has mean at least µ, and we give an algorithm with
O(K3 log2(K/µδ)/µ2) many rounds such that if all players execute it, they all learn
m with probability 1− δ. Setting δ = 1/K2T makes sure this simultaneously holds
for all players with probability ≥ 1 − 1/KT , and after this estimation is done, the
players can execute Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2. The additional regret due to esti-
mation rounds is bounded by O(K3m log2(KT /µ)/µ2).
Here is the algorithm each player executes (with pseudocode in Algorithm 3):
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let ε≔ µ((1− 1/K)−2/5 − 1)/48 and observe that since K ≥m ≥ 2,
ε = µ/4× 1
4
× 1
3
× ((1− 1/K)−2/5 − 1)
< µ/4× (1− 1/K)m−1 × ((1− 1/K)−2/5 +1)−1 × ((1− 1/K)−2/5 − 1)
= µ/4× (1− 1/K)m−1 × (1− 1/K)
−2/5 − 1
(1− 1/K)−2/5 +1
< µ/4× (1− 1/K)m−1.
First, the player pulls random arms for 8K log(K2/9δ)/ε2 rounds, and estimates
the quantities µj(1 − 1/K)m−1. By an argument similar to that of Lemma 2.1, she
obtains estimates σj such that |µj(1−1/K)m−1−σj | ≤ ε for all arms and for all players,
uniformly with probability 1− δ/3. Then let ℓ be the arm with maximum σ value.
We claim that µℓ ≥ µ/2. To justify this, note that
(1− 1/K)m−1µℓ ≥ σℓ − ε ≥ σ1 − ε ≥ (1− 1/K)m−1µ1 − 2ε ≥ (1− 1/K)m−1µ− 2ε,
whence µℓ ≥ µ− 2ε/(1− 1/K)m−1 ≥ µ/2, since ε ≤ µ/4× (1− 1/K)m−1.
Then the player tries to estimate µℓ itself, and uses the ratio µℓ/σℓ for esti-
mating m. For this, she tries 4K log(6K/µδ) times to explore the arm ℓ alone, using
a musical chairs type algorithm: she chooses an arm uniformly at random and
pulls it log(6/δ)/ε2 times. If this arm was arm ℓ and she receives a positive reward,
then she has the unbiased estimate for µℓ that she wants, otherwise she tries again.
Using an analysis similar to that of MusicalChairs2, after 4K log(6K/µδ) iterations,
with probability at least 1− δ/3 all players have explored their arm ℓ.
The exploration has log(6/δ)/ε2 rounds, and with probability 1 − δ/3, each
player obtains an estimate µ̂ for µℓ such that |µ̂− µℓ| ≤ ε.
Therefore, we have µℓ ∈ [µ̂− ε, µ̂+ ε] and that µℓ(1−1/K)m−1 ∈ [σℓ − ε,σℓ + ε].
Given the two intervals, we want to recover m. Since ε < µ/4 × (1 − 1/K)m−1 ×
(1−1/K)−2/5−1
(1−1/K)−2/5+1 , we have
µ̂+ ε
µ̂− ε ≤
σℓ + ε
σℓ − ε
≤ µℓ(1− 1/K)
m−1 +2ε
µℓ(1− 1/K)m−1 − 2ε
≤ µ(1− 1/K)
m−1/2+2ε
µ(1− 1/K)m−1/2− 2ε < (1− 1/K)
−2/5,
hence Lemma 4.2 below shows that m can be recovered uniquely.
Lemma 4.2. Let a,b,c,d,p > 0. Consider intervals [a,b] and [c,d] withmax{b/a,d/c} ≤
p2/5, and suppose there exists x ∈ [a,b],y ∈ [c,d] such that xpz = y for some integer z.
Then there exists a unique integer n such that [apn,bpn]∩ [c,d] , ∅.
Proof. The existence of such an n follows from existence of x and y and that xpz = y
for some integer z. For the uniqueness, note that we have [apn,bpn] ∩ [c,d] , ∅
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if and only if [loga/ logp + n, logb/ logp + n] ∩ [log c/ logp, logd/ logp] , ∅. Now
note that the interval [logc/ logp, logd/ logp] has length ≤ 2/5. Each interval In =
[loga/ logp + n, logb/ logp + n] also has length 2/5, hence In and In+1 are at least
3/5 apart from each other, hence [logc/ logp, logd/ logp] cannot intersect both of
them!
To bound the number of rounds of the algorithm, note that
(1− 1/K)−2/5 − 1 = (1+ 1
K − 1)
2/5 − 1 ≥ 1+ 2/5
K − 1 − 1 =
2
5(K − 1) > 2/5K,
thus ε ≥ µ/120K . So the number of rounds of the algorithm is 8K log(K2/9δ)/ε2 +
4K log(6K/µδ) log(6/δ)/ε2 =O(K3 log2(K/µδ)/µ2), as required.
Algorithm 3: algorithm for estimating the number of players m
Input: number of arms K , lower bound µ on µ1, failure probability δ
Output: number of players m
1 ε←− µ((1− 1/K)−2/5 − 1)/48
2 for 8K log(K2/9δ)/ε2 rounds do
3 pull a uniformly random arm j
4 σj ←− average reward received from arm j
5 end
6 Let ℓ←− argmaxj σj
7 for 4K log(6K/µδ) iterations do
8 Pick arm j uniformly at random
9 Pull j for log(6/δ)/ε2 times and let µ̂←− average reward received
10 if j = ℓ and µ̂ > 0 then output the unique m satisfying
[(µ̂− ε)(1− 1/K)m−1, (µ̂+ ε)(1− 1/K)m−1]∩ [σℓ − ε,σℓ + ε] , ∅
11 end
5 Proof of Theorem 1.3
First, the player pulls arms uniformly at random, and maintains an estimate for
the mean of each arm. An argument similar to that of Lemma 2.1 gives that, after
512K log(6mK/δ)/ε2 rounds, with probability at least 1−δ/2m all estimated means
are within ε/2 of the actual means. By a union bound over all players, this is true
uniformly over all players with probability at least 1− δ/2.
The player then sorts the µ̂i as µ̂i1 ≥ · · · ≥ µ̂iK . Then for j = 1, . . . ,K , she plays
MusicalChairs2 on {ij } (in this order) for 4K log(2mK/δ)/ε many rounds. If during
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any of these subroutines she occupies an arm, she chooses that action. Otherwise,
she chooses the dummy action 0. By Corollary 3.2, all the MusicalChairs2 sub-
routines for all players are successful with probability 1− δ/2. The pseudocode is
given as Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: algorithm for reaching an ε-approximate Nash Equilib-
rium in an anti-coordination game
Input: number of players m, number of arms K , accuracy ε, failure
probability δ
Output: action ℓ
1 µ̂i ←− 0 for all i ∈ [K]
2 for 512K log(6mK/δ)/ε2 rounds do
3 pull a uniformly random arm j
4 µ̂j ←− average reward received from arm j, divided by (1− 1/K)m−1
5 end
6 Sort the µ̂ vector as µ̂i1 ≥ · · · ≥ µ̂iK
7 ℓ←− 0
8 for j = 1 to K do
9 ℓ←−MusicalChairs2 ({ij }, 4K log(2mK/δ)/ε)
10 if ℓ , 0 then pull arm ℓ for the remaining K − j rounds
11 end
12 Output ℓ
We now show that the resulting assignment is an ε-Nash Equilibrium. Fix
any player p, and first suppose that she has output a non-dummy action ij . This
means all actions i1, i2, . . . , ij−1 were either occupied by other players, or had mean
< ε, or both. On the other hand, since the estimated means are within ε/2 of the
actual means, for any s < {i1, i2, . . . , ij−1} we have µps ≤ µij + (µ
p
s − µ̂s) + (µ̂ij − µ
p
ij
) ≤
µ
p
ij
+ ε, hence the player cannot increase her outcome by more than ε by switching
to action s. Finally, if the player has chosen the dummy action 0, that would mean
for each j ∈ [K], either action ij is occupied or µpj ≤ ε, or both. Thus, there is no
unoccupied action s with µ
p
s > ε, so again the player cannot increase her outcome
by more than ε by switching.
The total number of rounds is 512K log(6mK/δ)/ε2 +K ×4K log(2mK/δ)/ε =
O(K log(K/δ)/ε2 +K2 log(K/δ)/ε), as required.
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